University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

1-1-2010

Proof-of-knowledge of representation of committed value and its
applications
Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au

Yi Mu
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au

Man Ho Allen Au
University of Wollongong, aau@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers
Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons

Recommended Citation
Susilo, Willy; Mu, Yi; and Au, Man Ho Allen: Proof-of-knowledge of representation of committed value and
its applications 2010, 352-369.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1485

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Proof-of-knowledge of representation of committed value and its applications
Abstract
We present a zero-knowledge argument system of representation of a committed value. Specifically, for
commitments C = Commit1(y), D = Commit2(x), of value y and a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xL), respectively, our
argument system allows one to demonstrate the knowledge of (x, y) such that x is a representation of y to
bases h1, . . . , hL. That is, y = hx11 · · · hxLL . Our argument system is zero-knowledge and hence, it does
not reveal anything such as x or y. We note that applications of our argument system are enormous. In
particular, we show how round-optimal cryptography systems, where privacy is of a great concern, can be
achieved. We select three interesting applications with the aim to demonstrate the significance our
argument system. First, we present a concrete instantiation of two-move concurrently-secure blind
signature without interactive assumptions. Second, we present the first compact e-cash with
concurrentlysecure withdrawal protocol. Finally, we construct two-move traceable signature with
concurrently-secure join. On the side note, we present a framing attack against the original traceable
signature scheme within the original model.

Keywords
Proof, knowledge, representation, committed, value, its, applications

Disciplines
Physical Sciences and Mathematics

Publication Details
Au, M. Ho., Susilo, W. & Mu, Y. (2010). Proof-of-knowledge of representation of committed value and its
applications. In R. Steinfeld & P. Hawkes (Eds.), 15th Australasian Conference on Information Security and
Privacy (ACISP 2010) (pp. 352-369). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1485

Proof-of-Knowledge of Representation of Committed Value
and Its Applications
Man Ho Au, Willy Susilo and Yi Mu
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Australia
{aau,wsusilo,ymu}@uow.edu.au

Abstract. We present a zero-knowledge argument system of representation of a committed
value. Specifically, for commitments C = Commit1 (y), D = Commit2 (x), of value y and
a tuple x = (x1 , . . . , xL ), respectively, our argument system allows one to demonstrate
the knowledge of (x, y) such that x is a representation of y to bases h1 , . . . , hL . That is,
y = hx1 1 · · · hxLL . Our argument system is zero-knowledge and hence, it does not reveal
anything such as x or y. We note that applications of our argument system are enormous.
In particular, we show how round-optimal cryptography systems, where privacy is of a
great concern, can be achieved. We select three interesting applications with the aim to
demonstrate the significance our argument system. First, we present a concrete instantiation
of two-move concurrently-secure blind signature without interactive assumptions. Second,
we present the first compact e-cash with concurrently-secure withdrawal protocol. Finally,
we construct two-move traceable signature with concurrently-secure join. On the side note,
we present a framing attack against the original traceable signature scheme within the
original model.

1

Introduction

The notion of zero-knowledge proof protocol was put forth by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in
[34]. In a zero-knowledge proof protocol, a prover convinces a verifier that a statement is true, while
the verifier learns nothing except the validity of the assertion. A proof-of-knowledge [7] is a protocol
such that the verifier is convinced that the prover knows a certain quantity w satisfying some kinds
of relation R with respect to a commonly known string x. That is, the prover convinces the verifier
that he knows some w such that (w, x) ∈ R. If it can be done in such a way that the verifier learns
nothing besides the validity of the statement, this protocol is called a zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge (ZKPoK) protocol. Various efficient ZKPoK protocols about knowledge of discrete
logarithms and their relations have been proposed in the literature. For instance, knowledge of
discrete logarithm [46], polynomial relations of discrete logarithms [15, 27], inequality of discrete
logarithms [18], range of discrete logarithms [13] and double discrete logarithm [19].
ZKPoK protocols have been used extensively as building blocks of many cryptosystems. In this
paper, we present a ZKPoK protocol for the knowledge of representation of a committed value. We
demonstrate that our protocol can be used to construct round-optimal cryptosystems, including
blind signatures, traceable signatures and compact e-cash.
1.1

Related Work

ZKPoK of Double-Discrete Logarithm Our protocol generalizes the ZKPoK protocol of
double discrete logarithm ,introduced by Stadler [47], when it is used to construct a verifiable
secret sharing scheme. Roughly speaking, a double discrete logarithm of an element y to base g
x
and h is an element x such that y = g h . Stadler introduces a ZKPoK protocol to demonstrate the
knowledge of such x with respect to y. This protocol was employed in the construction of group
signatures [19, 2] and a divisible e-cash scheme [20]. Looking ahead, our zero-knowledge protocol
further extends Stadler’s protocol in which it allows the prover to demonstrate the knowledge of a
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x1

xL

set of values (x1 , . . . , xL , r) such that y = g h1 ···hL g0r . We would like to stress that there is a subtle
difference between Stadler’s protocol and ours when L = 1. Specifically, with the introduction of
the variable r, no information about x is leaked to the verifier. This turns out to be very useful
when the prover wishes to demonstrate the same x, without being linked, to different verifiers.
Blind signatures Introduced by Chaum [23], blind signature schemes allow a user to obtain
interactively a signature on message m from a signer in such a way that the signer learns nothing
about m (blindness) while at the same time, the user cannot output more signatures than the
ones produced from the interaction with the signer (unforgeability). The formal definition of blind
signatures was first proposed in [45], with the requirement that any user executing the protocol
` times with the signer cannot output ` + 1 valid signatures on ` + 1 distinct messages. One
important feature of security offered by any blind signature construction is whether the execution
of the signing protocol can be performed concurrently, that is, in an arbitrarily-interleaved manner.
As pointed out in [31], a notable exception to the problems of constructing schemes secure against
interleaving executions are those with an optimal two-move signing protocol, of which the problem
of concurrency is solved immediately.
Table 1 summarizes existing schemes that are secure under concurrent execution. Note that [36],
[31] and [35] provide generic construction only. [31] relies on generic NIZK while [35] utilizes ZAP.
On the other hand, as pointed out in [35], [36] makes use of generic concurrently-secure 2-party
computation and constructing such a protocol without random oracle or trusted setup is currently
an open problem. Lindell’s result [40] states that it is impossible to construct concurrently-secure
blind signatures in the plain model if simulation-based definitions are used. Hazay et al. [35] overcome this limitation by employing a game-based definition. A construction achieving all properties
is proposed in [32] recently.

Round-Optimal? W/o RO? Non-Interactive Assumption? Instantiation?
Schemes
[35]
×
X
X
?
[36]
×
X
X
×
[31]
X
X
X
?
[8]
X
×
×
X
[10]
X
×
×
X
[42]
×
X
X
X
[32]
X
X
X
X
Our Scheme
X
×
X
X
Table 1. Summary of Existing Blind Signatures Secure under Concurrent Signature Generation

Traceable Signatures Introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [24], group signatures allow a
group member to sign anonymously on behalf of the group. Whenever required, the identity
of the signature’s originator can be revealed only by the designated party. Traceable signatures,
introduced in [37], are group signatures with added functionality in which a designated party could
output some tracing information on a certain user that allows the bearer to trace all signatures
generated by that user. Subsequently, another traceable signature is propose in [25]. We discover
a flaw in the security proof of [37] and are able to develop a concrete attack against their scheme
under their model. Table 2 summarizes existing traceable signatures. Note that none of the existing
schemes is secure when the join protocol is executed concurrently. In contrast, group signature
scheme with concurrent join has been proposed in [39] and can also be constructed based on group
encryption [22].

Round-Optimal? W/o RO? Support Concurrent-Join? Secure?
Schemes
[37]
×
×
×
×
[25]
×
×
×
X
Our Scheme
X
×
X
X
Table 2. Summary of Existing Traceable Signatures
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Compact E-Cash Invented by Chaum [23], electronic cash (E-Cash) is the digital counterpart of
paper cash. In an e-cash scheme, a user withdraws an electronic coin from the bank and the user can
spend it to any merchant, who will deposit the coin back to the bank. Compact e-cash, introduced
in [16], aims at improving bandwidth efficiency. In compact e-cash, users can withdraw efficiently
a wallet containing K coins. These coins, however, must be spent one by one. Other constructions
of compact e-cash include [5, 3, 21]. Table 3 summarizes existing compact e-cash. Note that none
of the existing schemes is secure when the withdrawal protocol is executed concurrently.

Round-Optimal? W/o RO? Support Concurrent-Withdrawal?
Schemes
[16]
×
×
×
[5]
×
×
×
[3]
×
×
×
[21]
×
×
×
Our Scheme
X
×
X
Table 3. Summary of Existing Compact E-Cash Systems

1.2

Overview of Our Approach

As discussed in [39], the most efficient and conceptually simple joining procedure for a group
signature is for the user to choose a one way function f and compute x = f (x0 ) for some user
secret x0 . Next, the user sends x to the group manager (GM) and obtains a signature σ on x. A
group signature from the user will then consist of a probabilistic encryption of x into ψ under the
GM’s public key, and a signature-of-knowledge of (1) the correctness of ψ as an encryption of some
value x, (2) knowledge of x0 , a pre-image of x, and (3) knowledge of σ which is a valid signature on
x. This approach is suggested by Camenisch and Stadler [19], and is given the name “single-message
and signature-response paradigm” in [39]. Nonetheless, it turns out that a concrete instantiation
of this approach is not as simple as it looks, since it is hard to choose a suitable signature scheme
and function f so that efficient and secure proof is possible.
It turns out that our argument system together with the Boneh-Boyen signature [11] fits in
perfectly with the above paradigm. In our construction, f is chosen to be a perfectly hiding
malleable commitment scheme which allows the commitment of a block of values. This expands
the flexibility of the paradigm and allows the construction of traceable signatures, compact ecash as well as blind signature. Taking traceable signature as an example, a user first computes
a commitment f (x) of a secret value x. Due to the malleability of the commitment scheme, the
group manager changes it to a commitment of a block of values f (x, t) and issues a signature σ on
this commitment. To generate a traceable signature, the user computes a probabilistic encryption
of f (x, t) into ψ 1 , a random base g̃ = g r and a tracing tag T = g̃ t . Next, the user generates a
signature-of-knowledge of (1) the correctness of ψ, g̃ and T with respect to x and t, (2) knowledge
of x, t, a pre-image of f (x, t), and (3) knowledge of σ which is a valid signature on f (x, t). To
trace the user, the GM simply outputs t and everyone can test whether the tracing tag T and the
random base g̃ associated with each group signature satisfies T = g̃ t .

1.3

Organization of The Paper

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review preliminaries that will be
used throughout this paper. We then present our argument system, its security and efficiency
analysis in Section 3. Then, we apply our argument system in constructing blind signatures,
traceable signatures and compact e-cash. Those constructions are presented in Section 4, 5 and 6,
respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
1

In fact, this is for revealing signer’s identity and encryption of either f (x), x or σ also serves the purpose.
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2

Preliminaries

2.1

Notations

We employ the following notation throughout this paper. Let G1 be a cyclic group of prime order
p. Let Gq ⊂ Z∗p be a cyclic group of prime order q. This can be generated by setting p to be a
prime of the form p = γq + 1 for some integer γ and set Gq to be the group generated by an
element of order q in Z∗p .
Let g, g0 , g1 , g2 ∈R G1 be random elements of G1 and h, h0 , h1 , . . . , hL ∈R Gq be random
elements of Gq (with the requirement that none of them being the identity element of their
respective group). Since G1 and Gq are of prime order, those elements are generators of their
respective groups.
We say that a function negl(λ) is a negligible function [6], if for all polynomials f (λ), for all
sufficiently large λ, negl(λ) < 1/f (λ).

2.2

Bilinear Map

A pairing is a bilinear mapping from a pair of group elements to a group element. Specifically, let
GT be cyclic group of prime order p. A function ê : G1 × G1 → GT is said to be a pairing if it
satisfies the following properties:
–
–
–
–

(Bilinearity.) ê(ux , v y ) = ê(u, v)xy for all u, v ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zp .
(Non-Degeneracy.) ê(g, g) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the identity element in GT .
(Efficient Computability.) ê(u, v) is efficiently computable for all u, v ∈ G1 .
(Unique Representation.) All elements in G1 , GT have unique binary representation.

Looking ahead, while we are assuming G1 is equipped with a bilinear map, it is not necessary
for our zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of representation of committed value. Its presence is
mainly for the many applications associated with our protocol.

2.3

Number-Theoretic Assumptions

We present below the number-theoretic problems related to the schemes presented in this paper.
The respective assumptions state that no PPT algorithm has non-negligible advantage in security
parameter in solving the corresponding problems. Let G = hgi = hg1 i = · · · = hgk i be a cyclic
group.
– The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in G is to output x such that Y = g x on input Y ∈ G.
– The Representation Problem (RP) [14] in G is to compute a k-tuple (x1 , . . ., xk ) such that
Y = g1x1 · · · gkxk on input Y . RP is as hard as DLP if the relative discrete logarithm of any of
the gi ’s are not known.
– The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) ∈ G is to decide if z = xy on input a tuple
(g x , g y , g z ).
– The Decisional Linear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DLDH problem) [12] in G is to decide if
z = x + y on input a tuple (g1x , g2y , g3z ). The DLDH problem is strictly harder than the DDH
problem.
– The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (q-SDH problem) [11] in G is to compute a pair (A, e)
2
q
such that Ax+e = g on input (g x , g x , . . . , g x ).
– The y-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion Problem (y-DDHI problem) [29, 16] in G is to decide
2
y
if z = 1/x on input (g x , g x , . . ., g x , g z ).
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Cryptographic Tools

Commitment Schemes A commitment scheme is a protocol between two parties, namely, committer Alice and receiver Bob. It consists of two stages: the Commit stage and the Reveal stage.
In the Commit stage, Alice receives a value x as input, which is revealed to Bob at the Reveal
stage. Informally speaking, a commitment scheme is secure if at the end of the Commit stage,
Bob cannot learn anything about the committed value (a.k.a. hiding) while at the Reveal stage,
Alice can only reveal one value, that is x (a.k.a. binding). Formally, we review the security notion
from [33].
Definition 1. A commitment scheme (Gen, Commit)2 is secure if holding the following two properties:
1. (Perfect Hiding.) For all algorithm A (even computationally unbounded one), we require that

param ← Gen(1λ ); (x0 , x1 ) ← A(param);
1
P r  b ∈R {0, 1}; r ∈R {0, 1}λ ;
: b0 = b ≤ + negl(λ).
2
C = Commit(param, xb ; r); b0 ← A(C);


2. (Binding.) No PPT adversary A can open a commitment in two different ways. Specifically,

param ← Gen(1λ ); (x0 , x1 , r0 , r1 ) ← A(param) :
 = negl(λ).
P r  x0 6= x1 ∧
Commit(param, x0 ; r0 ) = Commit(param, x1 ; r1 )


In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a well-known non-interactive commitment scheme, the
Pedersen Commitment [43], which is reviewed very briefly here. On input a value x ∈ Zp , the
committer randomly chooses r ∈ Zp , computes and outputs commitment C = g0x g r as the commitment of value x. To reveal commitment C, the committer outputs (x, r). Everyone can test if
C = g0x g r . Sometimes (x, r) is referred to as an opening of the commitment C.
Recall that Pedersen Commitment is perfect hiding and computationally binding provided that
the g0 and g are randomly and independently generated and that relative discrete logarithm of g0
to base g is unknown. One can easily extend the scheme to allow commitment of a block of values,
say, x = (x0 , x1 , . . . , xk ) by setting the commitment C = g0x0 g1x1 · · · gkxk g r with additional random
generators g1 , . . . , gk of G1 .
Boneh-Boyen Short Signature Boneh and Boyen introduced a short signature scheme in [11],
which, is used extensively in the applications of our argument system. Hereafter, we shall refer to
this scheme as BB-signature.
KeyGen. Let α, β ∈R Z∗p and u = g α and v = g β . The secret key sk is (α, β) while the public key
pk is (ê, G1 , GT , p, g, u, v).
1
Sign. Given message m ∈ Z∗p , pick a random e ∈R Zp and compute A = g α+m+βe . The term
α + m + βe is computed modulo p. In case it is zero, choose another e. The signature σ on m
is (A, e).
Verify. Given a message m and signature σ = (A, r), verify that
ê(A, ug m v e ) = ê(g, g)
If the equality holds, output valid. Otherwise, output invalid.
2

With Gen being the parameter generation function.
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Σ-Protocol We restrict ourselves to a special class of ZKPoK protocol called Σ-protocol which
is defined below. Informally speaking, Σ-protocols only guarantee zero-knowledgeness when the
verifier is honest. We are interested in Σ-protocol since they can be transformed to 4-move perfect
zero-knowledge ZKPoK protocol [26]. They can also be transformed to 3-move concurrent zeroknowledge protocol in the auxiliary string model using trapdoor commitment schemes [28].
Definition 2. A Σ-protocol for a binary relation R is a 3-round ZKPoK protocol between two
parties, namely, a prover P and a verifier V. For every input (w, x) ∈ R to P and x to V, the first
round of the protocol consists of P sending a commitment t to V. V then replies with a challenge
c in the second round and P concludes by sending a response z in the last round. At the end of
the protocol, V outputs accept or reject. We say a protocol transcript (t, c, z) is valid if the output
of an honest verifier V is accept. A Σ-protocol has to satisfy the following two properties:
– (Special Soundness.) A cheating prover can at most answer one of the many possible challenges.
Specifically, there exists an efficient algorithm KE, called knowledge extractor, that on input x,
a pair of valid transcripts (t, c, z) and (t, c0 , z 0 ) with c 6= c0 , outputs w such that (w, x) ∈ R.
– (Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledgeness(HVZK).) There exists an efficient algorithm KS,
called zero-knowledge simulator, that on input x and a challenge c, outputs a pair (t, z) such
that (t, c, z) is a valid transcript having the same distribution as a real protocol transcript
resulted from the interaction between P with input (w, x) ∈ R and an honest V.
Signature of Knowledge Any Σ-protocol can be turned into non-interactive form, called signature of knowledge [19], by setting the challenge to the hash value of the commitment together
with the message to be signed [30]. Pointcheval and Stern [44] showed that any signature scheme
obtained this way is secure in the random oracle model [9].

3

A Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge Protocol for RCV

We present the main result of this paper, namely, a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol
of Representation of Committed Value, RCV. Specifically, let C = g0x g1r ∈ G1 be a commitment
mL s
1
of x with randomness r. Let D = hm
1 · · · hL h ∈ Gq be the commitment of x’s representation
(to bases h1 , . . . , hL , denoted as m) with randomness s ∈R Zq . We construct a ZKPoK protocol
of (x, m), denoted as PKRCV . Technically speaking, our protocol is an argument system rather
than a proof system in the sense that soundness in our system only holds against a PPT cheating
prover. This is sufficient for all our purposes when adversaries in the applications of our PKRCV
are modeled as PPT algorithms. PKRCV for C, D can be abstracted as follows.
n
PKRCV (x, r, s, m1 , . . . , mL ) :
o
mL s
mL
m1
1
C = g0x g r ∧ D = hm
·
·
·
h
h
∧
x
=
h
·
·
·
h
1
1
L
L
The construction of PKRCV consists of two parts. Note that while we describe them separately,
they can be executed in parallel in its actual implementation.
3.1

The Actual Protocol

We construct a Σ-Protocol of PKRCV . Let λk be a security parameter. In practice, we suggest
λk should be at least 80. The first part of PKRCV is a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of
representation of an element, and we adapt the protocol from [41].
(Commitment.) The prover randomly generates ρx , ρr ∈R Zp , computes and sends T = g0ρx g ρr
to the verifier.
(Challenge.) The verifier returns a random challenge c ∈R {0, 1}λk .
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(Response.) The prover, treating c as an element in Zp 3 , computes zx = ρx − cx ∈ Zp , zr =
ρr − cr ∈ Zp and returns (zx , zr ) to the verifier.
(Verify.) Verifier accepts if and only if T = C c g0zx g zr .
The second part is more involved and can be thought of as the extension of the ZKPoK of
double-discrete logarithm in combination with ZKPoK of equality of discrete logarithm.
(Commitment.) For i = 1 to λk , the prover randomly generates ρm1 ,i , . . ., ρmL ,i , ρs,i ∈R Zq and
ρ
ρm ,i
1 ···h mL ,i

h

ρ

ρm

,i

L
ρr,i ∈R Zp . Then the prover computes T1,i = g0 1
g ρr,i ∈ G1 and T2,i =h1m1 ,i · · · hL L
λk
ρs,i
h
∈ Gq . After that, the prover sends (T1,i , T2,i )i=1 to the verifier.
(Challenge.) The verifier returns a random challenge c ∈R {0, 1}λk .
(Response.) Denote c[i] as the i-th bit of c. That is, c[i] ∈ {0, 1}. For i = 1 to λk , the prover
computes zm1 ,i = ρm1 ,i − c[i]m1 ∈ Zq , . . ., zmL ,i = ρmL ,i − c[i]mL ∈ Zq , zs,i = ρs,i − c[i]s ∈ Zq
λk
zm ,i
z
to
and zr,i = ρr,i − c[i]h1m1 ,i · · · hL L r ∈ Zp . The prover sends zm1 ,i , . . . , zmL ,i , zs,i , zr,i i=1
the verifier.
(Verify.) The verifier accepts if the following equations hold for i = 1 to λk .

zmL ,i zs,i

z

?

T2,i = Dc[i] h1m1 ,i · · · hL
?

zm ,i
zm ,i
h1 1 ···hL L

T1,i = g0
?

g zr,i if c[i] = 0

z
zm ,i
1 ···h mL ,i
L

T1,i = C h1

h

g zr,i if c[i] = 1

The two parts should be executed in parallel using the same challenge. Regarding the security
of PKRCV , we have the following theorem whose proof can be found in the full version of the
paper [4].
Theorem 1. PKRCV is a Σ-Protocol.
3.2

Efficiency Analysis of PKRCV

Table 4 summarizes the time and space complexities of PKRCV . We breakdown the time complexity
of the protocol into the number of multi-exponentiations (multi-EXPs)4 in various groups. Note
that with pre-processing, prover’s online computation is minimal and does not involve any exponentiations. As for the bandwidth requirement, the non-interactive version is more space-efficient
since the prover does not need to include the commitment using the technique of [1].
In practice, we can take λk = 80 and p (resp. q) to be a 1024-bit (resp. 160-bit) prime. Thus,
Zp , Zq and G1 will take 1024, 160 and roughly 1024 bit, respectively. The non-interactive form
(of which our applications employ) takes up around (12 + 1.5L)kB. Looking ahead, L is 1, 3 and
3 in our construction of blind signature, traceable signature and compact e-cash, respectively.
The most dominant operation in our applications is the Multi-EXPs in group G1 since we are
using the elliptic curve group equipped with pairing. As a preliminary analysis, we find out that
one multi-EXP in G1 takes about 25ms. The timing is obtained on a Dell GX620 with an Intel
Pentium 4 3.0 GHz CPU and 2GB RAM running Windows XP Professional SP2 as the host. We
used Sun xVM VirtualBox 2.0.0 to emulate a guest machine of 1GB RAM running Ubuntu 7.04.
Our implementation is written in C and relies on the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library
(version 0.4.18). G1 is taken to be an elliptic curve group equipped with type A1 pairing and
the prime p is 1048 bits. In a nutshell, the verifier takes around 2 seconds in verifying the proof
PK
RCV .
3
4

Consequently, the bit-length of p should be longer than λk .
A multi-EXP computes the product of exponentiations faster than performing the exponentiations
separately. Normally, a multi-based exponentiation takes only 10% more time compared with a singlebased exponentiation. We assume that one multi-EXP operation multiplies up to 3 exponentiations.
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Time Complexities
Prover
Verifier
w/o Preproc. w/ Preproc.
G1 multi-EXP
λk + 1
0
λk + 1
Gq multi-EXP λk (dL/3e + 1) + 1
0
λk (dL/3e + 2)
Bandwidth Requirement
Interactive Form
Non-Interactive Form
G1
2λk + 1
0
Zp
λk + 2
λk + 2
Zq
λk (L + 1)
λk (L + 1)
Table 4. Time and Space Complexities of PKRCV .

4

Application to Round-Optimal Concurrently-Secure Blind Signature
without Interactive Assumptions

4.1

Syntax

We review the definition of blind signature from Hazay et al. [35].
Definition 3. A blind signature scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms BGen, BVer and an interactive protocol BSign between a user and a signer such that:
– BGen: On input security parameter 1λ , this algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
– BSign: Signer, with private input sk interacts with a user having input pk and a message m
in the protocol. At the end of the execution, user obtains a signature σm on the message m,
assuming neither party abort.
– BVer: On input pk, m, σm , outputs valid or invalid.
As usual, correctness requires that for all (pk, sk) output by BGen(1λ ), and for all σm which is
the output of the user upon successful completion of the protocol run of BSign with appropriate
inputs ((pk, m) and sk for user and signer respectively) to both parties, BVer with input pk, m, σm
outputs valid.
Definition 4. Blind signature scheme (BGen, BSign, BVer) is unforgeable if the winning probability for any PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible:
– BGen outputs (pk, sk) and pk is given to A.
– A interact concurrently with ` signer clones with input sk in BSign protocol.
– A outputs ` + 1 signatures σi on ` + 1 distinct messages mi .
A wins the game if all mi are distinct and BVer(pk, mi , σi ) = 1 for all i = 1 to ` + 1.
Definition 5. Blind signature scheme (BGen, BSign, BVer) satisfies blindness if the advantage
for any PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible:
– A outputs an arbitrary public key pk and two equal-length messages m0 , m1 .
– A random bit b ∈R {0, 1} is chosen, and A interacts concurrently with two user clones, say
U0 and U1 , with input (pk, mb ) and (pk, m1−b ) respectively. Upon completion of both protocols,
define σ0 and σ1 as follows:
• If either of the U0 or U1 aborts, set (σ0 , σ1 ) = (⊥, ⊥).
• Otherwise, define σi be the output of Ui for i = 0 and 1.
(σ0 , σ1 ) are given to A.
– A outputs a guess bit b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
A wins the game if all b0 = b. The advantage of A is defined as |P r[b0 = b] − 1/2|.
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Construction

BGen. Let α, β ∈R Zp and u = g α and v = g β . Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq be a collision-resistant hash
function. The signer’s secret key sk is (α, β) while its public key pk is (G1 , GT , ê, Gq , p, q, g, u,
v, h, h0 , h1 , H).
s
BSign. On input message m ∈ Zq , the user computes x = hm
0 h for some randomly generated
1
s ∈R Zq . The user sends x to the signer. The signer selects e ∈R Zp and computes A = g α+x+βe .
The signer returns (A, e) to the user.
The user computes Πm as an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of a BB signature (A, e) on a hidden value x, and that x is a commitment of m and output Πm as the signature
of m.
Specifically, denote y = hs . The user computes A1 = Ag2r1 , A2 = g1r1 g2r2 , A3 = g1y g2r3 for some
randomly generated r1 , r2 , r3 ∈R Zp and A4 = hs0 ht for some randomly generated t ∈R Zq . Parse
M = A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||A4 . The user computes the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge Πm comprising two parts, namely, SPK1 and SPK2 . SPK1 can be computed using
standard techniques, while SPK2 is computed using our newly constructed PKRCV . Finally, parse
Πm as (A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , SPK1 , SPK2 ).
n


SPK
(r1 , r2 , r3 , y, e, β1 , β2 , β3 , β4 ) :
1



β1 β2


A2 = g1r1 g2r2 ∧ 1 = A−e

2 g1 g2 ∧

−y β3 β4
y r3
1 ,u)
1 = A2 g1 g2 ∧ A3 = g1 g2 ∧ ê(A
Πm :
ê(g,g) =
o

m

r1
−e
β1
hm

0 )−y ê(g , g h0 )β3
ê(g
,
u)
ê(A
,
v)
ê(g
,
v)
ê(A
,
g
(M )

2
1
2
1
2

n
o


 SPK (r , y, s, t) : A = g y g r3 ∧ A = hs ht ∧ y = hs (M )
2
3
3
4
0
0
1 2
BVer. On input message m and its signature Πm , parse Πm as (A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , SPK1 , SPK2 )
and verify that SPK1 and SPK2 are valid.
Regarding the security of our construction, we have the following theorems whose proofs can
be found in the full version of the paper [4].
Theorem 2. Our blind signature is unforgeable under the q-SDH assumption in G1 and DL assumption in Gq in the random oracle model.
Theorem 3. Our blind signature satisfies blindness unconditionally in the random oracle model.

5

Application to Traceable Signatures with Concurrent Join

We describe the construction of our traceable signatures. Since traceable signatures are group signatures with added functionalities, it is easy to modify our scheme into a ‘regular’ group signature.
An attack to the traceable signature due to [37] is given in Appendix A.
5.1

Syntax

We review briefly the definition of traceable signature from Choi et al. [25] which is an adaptation of
the definition of traceable identification from Kiayias et al. [37]. Note that Traceable identifications
can be turned into traceable signatures using the Fiat-Shamir Heuristics [30].
Definition 6. A traceable signature scheme is a tuple of nine PPT algorithms / protocols (GGen,
Join, GSign, GVer, Open, Trace, Claim, ClaimVer) between three entities, namely group manager
(GM), users and tracing agents:
– GGen: On input security parameter 1λ , this algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk) for the group
manager.
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– Join: This is a protocol between a user and GM. Upon successful completion of the protocol,
user Ui obtains a membership certificate certi . The GM stores the whole protocol transcript
Jtransi .
– GSign: User Ui with membership certificate certi signs a message m and produces a group
signature σm .
– GVer: On input pk, m, σm , outputs valid or invalid.
– Open: On input m, σm , the group manager outputs the identity of the signer.
– Reveal: On input Jtransi , the group manager outputs tracing information tri , which is the
tracing trapdoor that allows party to identity signatures generated by user Ui .
– Trace: On input a signature σ and a tracing information tri , output 0/1 indicating the signature
is generated by user Ui or not.
– Claim: On input a signature σ and a membership certificate certi , user Ui produces a proof τ
to prove that he is the originator of the signature.
– ClaimVer” On input a signature σ, a proof τ , output 0/1 indicating the signature is generated
by claimer or not.
Security Requirements. We informally review the security notion of a traceable signature. Due
to page limitation, please refer to [37, 25] for formal definition. A traceable signature should be
secure against three types of attack.
(Misidentification.) The adversary is allowed to observe the operation of the system while users
are engaged with GM during the joining protocol. It is also allowed to obtain a signature from
existing users on any messages of its choice. They are also allowed to introduce users into the
system. The adversary’s goal is to produce a valid signature on new message that is not open
to users controlled by the adversary.
(Anonymity.) The adversary is allowed to observe the operation of the system while users are
engaged with GM during the joining protocol. It is also allowed to obtain signature from
existing users on any messages of its choice. They are also allowed to introduce users into the
system. Finally, the adversary chooses a message and two target users he does not control,
and then receives a signature of the message he returned from one of these two target users.
The adversary’s goal is to guess which of the two target users produced the signature.
(Framing.) The adversary plays the role of a malicious GM. It is considered successful with the
following scenarios. Firstly, the adversary may construct a signature that opens to an honest
user. Secondly, it may construct a signature, output some tracing information and that when
traced, this maliciously-constructed signature will be traced to be from an honest user. Thirdly,
it may claim a signature that was generated by an honest user as its own.
5.2

Construction

GGen. Let α, β ∈R Z∗p and u = g α and v = g β . H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq be a collision-resistant hash
1

function. Further, randomly generate γ1 , γ2 ∈R Zp , w3 ∈R G1 and compute w1 = w3γ1 and
1

w2 = w3γ2 . GM’s secret key sk is (α, β, γ1 , γ2 ) while its public key pk is (ê, G1 , GT , Gq , p, q, g, u,
v, w1 , w2 , w3 , h, h0 , h1 , . . ., h4 , H).
Join. A user Ui randomly selects s, x ∈R Zq and sends C0 = hs0 hx1 ∈ Gq to GM. GM computes
1
t = H(C0 ) ∈ Zq . It then computes C = C0 ht2 and selects e ∈R Zp . Next, it computes A = g α+C+βe .
s x t
The GM returns (A, e, t) to the user. User checks if ê(A, uv e g h0 h1 h2 ) = ê(g, g) and t = H(C0 ).
He then stores (A, e, s, t, x) as his membership certificate certi . GM records t as the tracing
information tri for this user. GM also stores the whole communication transcript.
0
GSign. Let the user membership certificate be (A ,e, s, t, x). The user computes S = hk3 , U = hk3 for
00
00
some randomly generated k, k 0 , k 00 ∈R Zq and T1 = S t , T2 = S k , T3 = hs0 hx1 T1k , V = U x . Denote
y = hs0 hx1 ht2 . The user then randomly generates r1 , r2 , r3 ∈R Zp , computes A1 = Aw3r1 +r2 , A2 =
w1r1 , A3 = w2r2 , A4 = g1y g2r3 and A5 = hr hs0 hx1 ht2 for some randomly generated r ∈R Zq . To generate
a traceable signature for message m, parse M = m||S||U ||T1 ||T2 ||T3 ||V ||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||A4 ||A5 .
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The user computes the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge Πgrp comprising two parts, namely, SPK3 and SPK4 . SPK3 can be computed using standard techniques,
while SPK4 is computed using PKRCV . Finally, parse Πgrp as (A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , A5 , SPK3 , SPK4 )
and the signature σm as (Πgrp , S, T1 , T2 , T3 , U, V ).
n


SPK
(r1 , r2 , r3 , y, e, β1 , β2 , β3 , β4 , r, s, t, x, k, k 0 , k 00 ) :

3



β1
β2


A2 = w1r1 ∧ 1 = A−e
∧ 1 = A−y
2 w1
2 w1 ∧


−y
β

r
−e
3

A3 = w22 ∧ 1 = A3 w1 ∧ 1 = A3 w1β4 ∧




A4 = g1y g2r3 ∧ A5 = hr hs0 hx1 ht2 ∧


00
00

S = hk3 ∧ T1 = S t ∧ T2 = S k ∧ T3 = hs0 hx1 T1k ∧
Πgrp :
0
1 ,u)

U = hk3 ∧ V = U x ∧ ê(A

ê(g,g) =

o


r1 +r2
−e
β1 +β3
−y
β2 +β4

(M )
ê(w
,
u)
ê(A
,
v)
ê(w
,
v)
ê(A
,
g)
ê(w
,
g)

3
1
2
1
3


n



SPK4 (r3 , y, r, s, t, x) :



o



A4 = g1y g2r3 ∧ A5 = hr hs0 hx1 ht2 ∧ y = hs0 hx1 ht2 (M )
Basically, A1 , A2 and A3 is the linear encryption of A (part of the membership certificate), T1 ,
T2 , T3 is the El-Gamal encryption of hs0 hx1 (under the public key S t ), while the rest of the proof is
to assure the verifier that the encryptions are properly done and that values U , V , S are correctly
formed with respective to values s, t, x, r.
1
Open. On input a signature σm , GM computes A := AγA
1 γ2 . From A, GM looks up its list of join
2 A3
transcripts and identify the underlying user.
Reveal. To allow tracing of user Ui , the GM outputs tracing information tri .
Trace. Given a valid signature σm = (Πgrp , S, T1 , T2 , T3 , U, V ) and tracing information tri , everyone
?

?

can test if the signature is from user Ui by testing T1 = S tri and tri = H( TTtr3i ).
2

Claim. On input a message σm = (Πgrp , S, T1 , T2 , T3 , U, V ), the originator can produce an noninteractive proof τ as
τ : SPKτ {(x) : V = U x }(σm )
ClaimVer. Given a signature σm and τ , everyone can verify τ .
Regarding the security of traceable signature, we have the following theorem whose proof can
be found in the full version of the paper [4].
Theorem 4. Our traceable signature is secure under the q-SDH assumption, the DLDH assumption in G1 and DL assumption in Gq in the random oracle model.

6

Compact E-Cash With Concurrent Withdrawal

Our technique can also be applied to construct compact e-cash systems with concurrently-secure
withdrawal protocol. Due to page limitation, only high-level description is given here. Its detail,
together with definitions shall be found in the full version of the paper [4]. Roughly speaking,
there are three entities, namely, the bank, users and merchants, in a compact e-cash system. To
withdraw a wallet of K coins, user obtains a BB signature cert on commitment of values (s, t, x),
in a similar manner as user obtains a membership certificate in our construction of traceable
signatures. Note that the major difference being in this case, none of the values are known to the
bank (with s being a random number jointly generated by the bank and user).
1

To spend a electronic coin to a merchant, user computes a serial number S = h3s+J+1 , a tracing
R

tag T = hs0 ht1 hx2 h3t+J+1 , where J is the counter of the number of times the user has spent his wallet
and R is a random challenge issued by the merchant. User sends the pair (S, T ) to the merchant,
along with a signature of knowledge Π$ , stating that S and T are correctly formed. Specifically,
the proof assures the merchant that (1)user is in possession of a valid BB signature from the bank
on values (s, t, x); (2)counter 0 ≤ J < K; (3)S and T are correctly formed with respect to (s, t, x).
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In the deposit protocol, merchant sends the coin (Π$ , S, T, R) to the bank. Since counter J
runs from 0 to K − 1, user can at most spend his wallet for K times. If the user uses the counter
for a second time, the serial number S of the double-spent coins will be the same and will thus be
R0
0
identified. Next, the bank can compute a value C := ( TT 0R )1/(R −R) , the commitment of (s, t, x)
which allows the bank to identify the underlying double-spender.

7

Conclusion

We constructed a new zero-knowledge argument system and illustrated its significance with applications to blind signatures, traceable signatures and compact e-cash systems. We believe this
system is useful in other cryptographic applications.
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A

A Framing Attack on KTY Traceable Signatures

In this section, we present a high level description of the traceable signatures from [37] (KTY)
and a concrete attack within their security model.
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Overview of the KTY Traceable Signature
GGen: The group manager chooses a signature scheme. The signature scheme in KTY is in fact
a variant of the CL signature [17].
Join: User chooses a random number x0 and obtains a CL signature (denoted as cert) from the
GM on values x0 , x using the signature generation protocol of CL signature. In particular, x0
is unknown to GM while x is known. The value x is stored as the tracing information tr of the
user. User stores cert as his membership certificate.
GSign: To sign a message m, user with membership certificate cert on values x0 , x first computes:
1. a tuple (T1 , T2 , T3 ), which is the El-Gamal encryption of part of cert.
2. a tuple (T4 , T5 ) such that T5 = g k0 and T4 = T5x 0for some random number k.
3. a tuple (T6 , T7 ) such that T7 = g k and T6 = T7x for some random number k 0 .
The traceable signature is a signature of knowledge σm such that (T1 , . . . , T7 ) are correctly
formed.
GVer: The verifier simply verifies the signature-of-knowledge σm .
Open: On input m, σm , the group manager outputs the identity of the signer by decrypting
T1 , T2 , T3 and obtains cert of the user.
Reveal: On input Jtransi , the group manager outputs tracing information tr = x.
?
Trace: On input a signature σm and a tracing information tr, test whether T4 = T5x .
Claim/ClaimVer: To claim a signature, the signer produces a non-interactive proof-of-knowledge
of discrete logarithm of T6 to base T7 (which is x0 ).
The Framing Attack The framing attack is considered successful if the attacker can generate a
signature that traces to an honest user. Specifically, the adversary is considered successful if it can
∗
∗
output a signature σm
such that Trace(Reveal(Jtransi ), σm
) = 1 and that user Ui is an honest user
∗
∗
does not need to open
who has not generated σm himself. The attack is based on the fact that σm
to Ui , and the attacker knows the corresponding tracing information, that is, x, of an honest user.
To frame an honest user, the adversary generates another membership certificate cert∗ on values
∗
. Obviously, this signature will trace to the honest user.
x∗ , x and uses it to produce a signature σm
The attack is possible due to a flaw in the security proof [38] (full version of [37] , Section 9.3),
in which it is stated that “Then if the adversary outputs an identification transcript that either
opens to user j traces to the user j, it is clear that we can rewind the adversary and obtain a
witness for that transcript that will reveal the logarithm of C base b, and thus solving the discretelogarithm problem.” The argument is true when the identification transcript opens to user j in
which it helps solving the discrete logarithm of C to base b (which is x0 , the user secret). However
the same argument is not applicable to the case of tracing because the tracing information x for
user j is in fact known to the adversary. The adversary is not required to use the same x0 with
the honest user in producing the signature for framing to be successful.
The Proposed Fix It turns out that the same attack is not applicable to the pairing-based
traceable signatures [25] (CPY). The reason is that the tracing information tr is of the form g x
and, although tr is known to GM, the value x is unknown and correctness of tr is implicitly checked
in a signature of knowledge of x. The same idea, however, is not applicable to the original KTY
scheme because the tracing mechanism in CPY requires the use of a bilinear map5 which is not
known to exists in the group of which KTY is built on. Thus, we propose another fix. That is, the
0
tracing information tr is no longer randomly chosen. Instead, it is set to be H(Ci ), where Ci = bxi
is known to GM during the join protocol in KTY, for some collision-resistant hash function H.
The group signature will be modified so that the user will encrypt Ci under the public key g tr
(using El-Gamal Encryption), together with a proof-of-correctness, including the knowledge of Ci
?

to base bi . The corresponding Trace algorithm is also modified to include a test that tr = H(Ci )
when tr is given. Indeed, this idea is employed in our construction of traceable signatures.
5

?

Specifically, for each signature, user produces values T4 , T5 such that the tracing agent test if ê(tr, T4 ) =
T5 . The user also includes a proof-of-knowledge of discrete logarithm (that is, knowledge of x) of T5 to
base ê(g, T5 ) in the signature.

